Sufiforum.com

2009'da başlayan SUFİFORUM'da İslam; İslam Tasavvuf Geleneği ile ilgili her türlü güncel ya da 'eskimez' konular yer almaktadır. İçerik yenilemeleri tasavvuf.name sitesinden sürdürülmektedir. ALLAH YÂR OLSUN.

Giriş |  Kayıt




Yeni başlık gönder Başlığa cevap ver  [ 4 mesaj ] 
Yazar Mesaj
 Mesaj Başlığı: East Turkestan and Urumchi : Demographics
MesajGönderilme zamanı: 14.07.09, 12:58 #mesajın linki (?)
Çevrimdışı
Kullanıcı avatarı

Kayıt: 14.12.08, 12:14
Mesajlar: 1108
Xinjiang
(Mandarin pronunciation: [ɕíntɕjɑ́ŋ]; Uyghur: شىنجاڭ, Shinjang; Chinese: 新疆; pinyin: Xīnjiāng; Wade-Giles: Hsin1-chiang1; Postal map spelling: Sinkiang) is an autonomous region (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) of the People's Republic of China and also claimed by the territory of Republic of China (current government ruling Taiwan).

It is a large, sparsely populated area, spanning over 1.6 million km2 (comparable in size to Iran), which takes up about one sixth of the country's territory. Xinjiang borders the Tibet Autonomous Region and India's Leh District to the south and Qinghai and Gansu provinces to the southeast, Mongolia to the east, Russia to the north, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the west. It administers most of Aksai Chin, a territory formally part of Kashmir's Ladakh region over which India has claimed sovereignty since 1962.

"Xinjiang" or "Ice Jecen" in Manchu, literally means "New Frontier" a name given during the Manchu Qing Dynasty in China.[1] It is home to a number of different ethnic groups, many of them Turkic, the largest of which is the Uyghur people. Older English-language reference works often refer to the area as Chinese Turkestan[2], Sinkiang, East Turkestan, or Uyghuristan. More specifically, at times, the term East Turkestan only referred to Xinjiang area south of Tien Shan, North of Tien Shan was called Dzungaria (Zungaria). [3]

East Turkestan: Demographics

The languages of Xinjang.East Asian migrants arrived in the eastern portions of the Tarim Basin about 3,000 years ago, while the Uighur peoples arrived after the collapse of the Orkon Uighur Kingdom, based in modern-day Mongolia, around the year 842.[35]

Xinjiang is home to several distinct ethnic groups of various religious traditions, however, the majority of the region's total population are adherents of Islam. Among ethnic groups who are of the Muslim faith, most notable are Muslim Turkic peoples including the Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tatars and the Kazakhs; there are also Muslim Iranian peoples including Pamiris and the Sarikolis/Wakhis (often conflated as Pamiris); and Muslim Sino-Tibetan peoples such as the Hui (i.e. Muslim Han Chinese). Other PRC ethnic groups in the region include Han Chinese, Mongols, Russians, Xibes, and Manchus.

Three Uyghur girls at a Sunday market in the oasis city Khotan.The percentage of ethnic Han Chinese in Xinjiang has grown from 6% in 1949[36][unreliable source?] to an official tally of over 40% at present.[37] This figure does not include military personnel or their families, or the many unregistered migrant workers. Much of this transformation can be attributed to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a semi-military organization of settlers that has built farms, towns, and cities over scattered parts of Xinjiang. The demographic transformation is held by Uyghur independence advocates as a threat to Uyghurs and other non-Han ethnicities in maintaining their culture, similar to the case of Tibet. In 1953 about three-fourths of the population lived south of the mountains in the Tarim Basin and the Han influx was directed mainly to the Dzungaria (north of the mountains in the Tarim Basin ) because of its resource potential.[38] The minorities of Xinjiang have been exempted from the one-child policy and many Uyghur people emigrated out of Xinjiang to other parts of China, and consequently the percentage of Uyghur people in the total population of China has increased steadily.

Major ethnic groups in Xinjiang by region, 2000 census.[notes 1][39]
Uyghurs Han Chinese Kazakhs others
Xinjiang 45.2% 40.6% 6.7% 7.5%
Ürümqi PLC 12.8% 75.3% 2.3% 9.6%
Karamay PLC 13.8% 78.1% 3.7% 4.5%
Turpan Prefecture 70.0% 23.3% <0.1% 6.6%
Kumul Prefecture 18.4% 68.9% 8.8% 3.9%
Changji AP + Wujiaqu DACLC 3.9% 75.1% 8.0% 13.0%
Bortala AP 12.5% 67.2% 9.1% 11.1%
Bayin'gholin AP 32.7% 57.5% <0.1% 9.7%
Aksu Prefecture + Alar DACLC 71.9% 26.6% <0.1% 1.4%
Kizilsu AP 64.0% 6.4% <0.1% 29.6%
Kashgar Prefecture + Tumushuke DACLC 89.3% 9.2% <0.1% 1.5%
Khotan Prefecture 96.4% 3.3% <0.1% 0.2%
Ili AP[notes 2] 16.1% 44.4% 25.6% 13.9%
- Kuitun DACLC 0.5% 94.6% 1.8% 3.1%
- former Ili Prefecture 27.2% 32.4% 22.6% 17.8%
- Tacheng Prefecture 4.1% 58.6% 24.2% 13.1%
- Altay Prefecture 1.8% 40.9% 51.4% 5.9%
Shihezi DACLC 1.2% 94.5% 0.6% 3.7%

Ethnic groups in East Turkestan, 2000 census.
Excludes members of the People's Liberation Army in active service.[40]
Nationality Population Percentage
Uyghur 8,345,622 45.21
Han 7,489,919 40.58
Kazakh 1,245,023 6.74
Hui 839,837 4.55
Kirghiz 158,775 0.86
Mongols, Dongxiangs ,Daurs 194,891 1.14
Pamiris 39,493 0.21
Xibe 34,566 0.19
Manchu 19,493 0.11
Tujia 15,787 0.086
Uzbek 12,096 0.066
Russian 8935 0.048
Miao 7006 0.038
Tibetan 6153 0.033
Zhuang 5642 0.031
Tatar 4501 0.024
Salar 3762 0.020

In general, Uyghurs are the majority in western Xinjiang, including the prefectures of Kashgar, Khotan, Kizilsu, and Aksu, as well as Turpan prefecture in eastern Xinjiang. Han Chinese are the majority in eastern and northern Xinjiang, including the cities of Urumqi, Karamay, Shihezi and the prefectures of Changji, Bortala, Bayin'gholin, Ili (especially the city of Kuitun), and Kumul. Kazakhs are mostly concentrated in Ili prefecture in northern Xinjiang.

Some Uighur scholars claim descent from both the Turkic Uighurs and the pre-Turkic Tocharians (or Tokharians, whose language was Indo-European), and relatively fair-skin, hair and eyes, as well as other so-called 'Caucasoid' physical traits, are not uncommon among them. In general Uyghurs resemble those peoples who live around them in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. In 2002, there were 9,632,600 males (growth rate of 1.0%) and 9,419,300 females (growth rate of 2.2%). The population overall growth rate was 10.9‰, with 16.3‰ of birth rate and 5.4‰ mortality rate.

Nüfusu ve etnik yapısı [değiştir]2000 nüfus sayımına göre nüfusu ve etnik yapısı. Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu、Halk Silahlı Polisi sayılmamaktadır.

Millet Nüfus Oran (%) Din Kendi Adlandırması
Uygurlar 8,345,622 45,21 Türk İslam
Hanlar 7,489,919 40,58 Sino-Tibet Budizm
Kazaklar 1,245,023 6,74 Türk İslam
Huiler 839,837 4,55 Çin İslam
Kırgızlar 158,775 0,860 Türk İslam
Moğollar (Oyrat) 149,857 0,810 Moğol %95 Budist, %5 İslam
Tungşanlar[kaynak belirtilmeli] 55,841 0,300 Moğol İslam Sarta
Tacikler 39,493 0,210 İranî İslam
Şibeler[kaynak belirtilmeli] 34,566 0,190 Tunguz
Mançular 19,493 0,110 Tunguz
Tuçialar[kaynak belirtilmeli] 15,787 0,086 Sina-Tibet
Özbekler 12,096 0,066 Türk İslam
Ruslar 8,935 0,048 Rus Ortodoks
Miaolar 7,006 0,038 Mong
Tibetliler 6,153 0,033 Sino-Tibet Budizm %49, Ateizm %47 bod rig
Çuanglar[kaynak belirtilmeli] 5,642 0,031 Tay Bouчcueŋь
Dahurlar 5,541 0,030 Moğol
Tatarlar 4,501 0,024 Türk İslam %83
Salarlar 3,762 0,020 Türk İslam



The east-west Tien Shan Mountains separate Dzungaria in the north from the Tarim Basin in the south. Dzungaria is dry steppe. The Tarim Basin is desert surrounded by oases. In the east is the Turfan Depression. In the west, the Tien Shan split, forming the Ili River valley.

***

Urumchi or Ürümqi

(English pronunciation: /uːˈruːmtʃi/), in Chinese Pinyin spelled Wulumuqi; Uyghur: ئۈرۈمچی‎, Ürümchi; simplified Chinese: 乌鲁木齐; traditional Chinese: 烏魯木齊; pinyin: Wūlǔmùqí) is the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, in the northwest of the country.

With an urban population of over 2.3 million people, Ürümqi, whose name means "beautiful pasture", is by far the largest city on China's vast Western interior. Since the 1990s Urumqi has become gradually developed economically and now serves as a regional transport node and commercial centre. Urumqi has a majority Han Chinese population, with the largest minorities being the Turkic ethnic groups Uyghur people and Kazakhs with Chinese ethnic group Hui people.

According to the 2000 census, Ürümqi has 2,081,834 inhabitants, with a population density of 174.53 inhabitants/km². Of these, 75.3% are Han Chinese, 15.8% are Uyghurs, 8.0% are Hui and 2.3% are Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.

Urumçi, (Uygurca: ئۈرۈمچی, Ürümchi, Çince: 乌鲁木齐 / 烏魯木齊, Wūlǔmùqí), Çin'in kuzeydoğusunda yer alan, Doğu Türkistan adıyla da bilinen, Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nin başkentidir. 10 milyon nüfuslu bir şehir olup 10.989 km²'lik bir alan kaplar. Şehrin adı 1954'e kadar Dihua`ydı. Bu tarihten sonra ismi Urimçi ve günümüzde de Wurimçi olarak değiştirilmiştir. Çin'in batıya açılan en önemli güzergahlarındandır. Demiryolu taşımacılığında önemli bir geçittir. 174,53 kişi/km².

Yüzyıllardan bu yana müslüman- Türk nüfusun baskın olarak yaşadığı Urumçi, son yüzyılda Çin'in baskıları ve nüfus mübadele çabaları ile müslüman- Türk nüfusun azalması ile karşı karşıyadır.

1959 yılı öncesinde 40 milyon olan Türk nüfus, 1959 yılı sonrası, baskılar ve doğum kontrolleri ile 20 milyon kişiye düşürülmüştür. Bu sonuç, 1959'dan günümüze doğal olarak 70 milyon olması gereken nüfusunun 20 milyona düşmesi; Türk nüfus üzerinde soykırım uyguladığının açıkça bir kanıtıdır. (=Chinese style demographic assimilation)

demografik (sıfat) -Fransızca démographique- :Nüfusbilimsel.

asimilasyon: -Fransızca assimilation- Farklı kökenden gelen azınlıkları veya etnik grupları, bunların kültür birikimlerini, kimliklerini baskın doku ve yapı içinde eriterek yok etme.

Urumçi'nin etnik yapısı aşağıdaki gibidir;

Etnik grup Nüfus Oran (%)
Han 5,000,000 %45,3
Uygur 4,400,000 %42,79
Hui 167,148 %8,03
Kazak 48,772 %2,34
Mançu 7,682 %0,37
Moğol 7,252 %0,35
Xibe 3,674 %0,18
Rus 2,603 %0,13
Tujia 1,614 %0,08
Kırgız 1,436 %0,07
Özbek 1,406 %0,07
Zhuang 878 %0,04
Tatar 767 %0,04
Tibetli 665 %0,03
Dongxiang 621 %0,03
Miao 620 %0,03
Koreli 588 %0,03
diğerleri 2.205 %0,09





http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang_U ... ous_Region

_________________
" Hayrlar feth olsun ; şerler def olsun !..."


En son arsiv tarafından 14.07.09, 13:53 tarihinde düzenlendi, toplamda 8 kere düzenlendi.

Başa Dön
 Profil Özel mesaj gönder  
 
 Mesaj Başlığı: Re: East Turkestan and Urumchi : Demographics
MesajGönderilme zamanı: 14.07.09, 13:12 #mesajın linki (?)
Çevrimdışı
Kullanıcı avatarı

Kayıt: 14.12.08, 12:14
Mesajlar: 1108
Tibet Demographics

Historically, the population of Tibet consisted of primarily ethnic Tibetans and some other ethnic groups. According to tradition the original ancestors of the Tibetan people, as represented by the six red bands in the Tibetan flag, are: the Se, Mu, Dong, Tong, Dru and Ra. Other traditional ethnic groups with significant population or with the majority of the ethnic group reside in Tibet (excluding disputed area with India) include Bai people, Blang, Bonan, Dongxiang, Han, Hui Chinese, Lhoba, Lisu people, Miao, Mongols, Monguor (Tu people), Menba (Monpa), Mosuo, Nakhi, Qiang, Nu people, Pumi, Salar, and Yi people.

The issue of the proportion of the Han Chinese population in Tibet is a politically sensitive one and is disputed. The Central Tibetan Administration, an exile group, says that the PRC has actively swamped Tibet with Han Chinese migrants in order to alter Tibet's demographic makeup.[109]

View of the Tibetan exile community
Between the 1960s and 1980s, many political prisoners from other parts of China (over 1 million, according to Harry Wu) were sent to laogai (or "reform through labor") camps in Qinghai.

"The most important evidence comes from an official report written to Premier Zhou Enlai in 1962 by the late Panchen Lama, then head of the Tibetan government. The report noted that "there has been an evident and severe reduction in the present-day Tibetan population" due to the fact that "many people have been lost in battle," "many people were arrested and imprisoned [which] caused large numbers of people to die abnormal deaths," and "many people died of starvation or because they were so physically weak that they could not resist minor illnesses". . . . In a speech delivered in 1987, the Panchen Lama estimated the number of prison deaths in Qinghai at around 5 percent of the total population in the area."[110]
Since the 1980s, increasing economic liberalization and internal mobility has also resulted in the influx of many Han Chinese into Tibet for work or settlement, though the actual number of this floating population remains disputed.

The Government of Tibet in Exile claims that, despite official statistics to the contrary, in reality non-ethnic Tibetans (including Han Chinese and Hui Muslims) outnumber ethnic Tibetans. It claims that this is as a result of an active policy of demographically swamping the Tibetan people and further diminishing any chances of Tibetan political independence[109]. The Dalai Lama has recently been reported as saying that the Tibetans had been reduced to a minority "in his homeland", by reference to population figures of Lhasa, and accusing China of "demographic aggression".[111]

The Government of Tibet in Exile questions all statistics given by the PRC government, since they do not include members of the People's Liberation Army garrisoned in Tibet, or the large floating population of unregistered migrants[109]. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway (Xining to Lhasa) completed in July 2006 is also a major concern, exiled Tibetan Lhadon Tethong said the railway is to further facilitate the influx of migrants.[112]

The Government of Tibet in Exile quotes an issue of People's Daily published in 1959 to claim that the Tibetan population has dropped significantly since 1959. According to the article, figures from the National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC show that the autonomous region of Tibet was populated by 1,273,969 persons. In the Tibetan sectors of Kham, 3,381,064 Tibetans were counted. In Qinghai and other Tibetan sectors that are incorporated in Gansu, 1,675,534 Tibetans were counted. According to the total of these three numbers, the Tibetan population attained 6,330,567 in 1959. [113]

In 2000, the number of Tibetans as a whole of these regions was about 5,400,000 according to National Bureau of Statistics[114].

The Government of Tibet in Exile claims that a comparison of these statistics originating from National Bureau of Statistics shows that between 1959 and 2000, the Tibetan population decreased by about one million, a 15% decline. During the same period, the Chinese population doubled, and the world-wide population increased by 3-fold.[115] This analysis gives an additional argument concerning the estimation of the number of Tibetan deaths during the period between 1959 and 1979.It also suggests the existence of a demographic deficit of the Tibetan population and the precise time course and causes must be specified.


Traditional Kham housesThe accuracy of this 1959 Tibetan population estimate quoted by the Government of Tibet in Exile is in conflict with the findings of the 1954 Chinese census report. The census states that the total population of the autonomous region of Tibet was 1,273,969; the total population of Kham was 3,381,064; and the total population of Qinghai was 1,675,534.[116] These numbers were taken by the Government of Tibet in Exile as the population of Tibetans in each province. However, in all of these provinces, Tibetans were not the only traditional ethnic group. Especially in Qinghai, which has a historical mixture of different groups of ethnics. In 1949, Han Chinese made up 48.3% of the population, the rest of the ethnic groups make up 51.7% of the 1.5 million total population. [117] As of today, Han Chinese account for 54% of the total population of Qinghai, which is slightly higher than in 1949. Tibetans make up around 20% of the population of Qinghai.


View of the People's Republic of China
The PRC also does not recognize Greater Tibet as claimed by the government of Tibet in Exile. The PRC government claims that the ethnically Tibetan areas outside the TAR were not controlled by the Tibetan government before 1959 in the first place, having been administered instead by other surrounding provinces for centuries. It further alleges that the idea of "Greater Tibet" was originally engineered by foreign imperialists in order to divide China amongst themselves (Mongolia being a striking precedent, gaining independence with Soviet backing and subsequently aligning itself with the Soviet Union).[118]

The PRC gives the number of Tibetans in Tibet Autonomous Region as 2.4 million, as opposed to 190,000 non-Tibetans, and the number of Tibetans in all Tibetan autonomous entities combined (slightly smaller than the Greater Tibet claimed by exiled Tibetans) as 5.0 million, as opposed to 2.3 million non-Tibetans. In the TAR itself, much of the Han population is to be found in Lhasa. Population control policies like the one-child policy only apply to Han Chinese, not to minorities such as Tibetans [119].

Jampa Phuntsok, chairman of the TAR, has also said that the central government has no policy of migration into Tibet due to its harsh high-altitude conditions, that the 6% Han in the TAR is a very fluid group mainly doing business or working, and that there is no immigration problem. (This report includes both permanent and temperature residences in Tibet, but excludes Tibetans studying or working outside of TAR) [120] By 2006, 3% of the permanent residences in Tibet are of Han ethnic, according to National Bureau of Statistics of China. [121]

With regards to the historical population of ethnic Tibetans, the Chinese government claims that according to the First National Census conducted in 1954, there were 2,770,000 ethnic Tibetans in China, including 1,270,000 in the TAR; whereas in the Fourth National Census conducted in 1990, there were 4,590,000 ethnic Tibetans in China, including 2,090,000 in the TAR. These figures are used to advance the claim that the Tibetan population has doubled since 1951. [122]

This table[123] includes all Tibetan autonomous entities in the PRC, plus Xining PLC and Haidong P. The latter two are included to complete the figures for Qinghai province, and also because they are claimed as parts of Greater Tibet by the Government of Tibet in exile.

P = Prefecture; AP = Autonomous prefecture; PLC = Prefecture-level city; AC = Autonomous county.

Excludes members of the People's Liberation Army in active service.

Major ethnic groups in Greater Tibet by region, 2000 census.
Total Tibetans Han Chinese others
Tibet Autonomous Region: 2,616,329 2,427,168 92.8% 158,570 6.1% 30,591 1.2%
- Lhasa PLC 474,499 387,124 81.6% 80,584 17.0% 6,791 1.4%
- Qamdo Prefecture 586,152 563,831 96.2% 19,673 3.4% 2,648 0.5%
- Shannan Prefecture 318,106 305,709 96.1% 10,968 3.4% 1,429 0.4%
- Xigazê Prefecture 634,962 618,270 97.4% 12,500 2.0% 4,192 0.7%
- Nagqu Prefecture 366,710 357,673 97.5% 7,510 2.0% 1,527 0.4%
- Ngari Prefecture 77,253 73,111 94.6% 3,543 4.6% 599 0.8%
- Nyingchi Prefecture 158,647 121,450 76.6% 23,792 15.0% 13,405 8.4%
Qinghai Province: 4,822,963 1,086,592 22.5% 2,606,050 54.0% 1,130,321 23.4%
- Xining PLC 1,849,713 96,091 5.2% 1,375,013 74.3% 378,609 20.5%
- Haidong Prefecture 1,391,565 128,025 9.2% 783,893 56.3% 479,647 34.5%
- Haibei AP 258,922 62,520 24.1% 94,841 36.6% 101,561 39.2%
- Huangnan AP 214,642 142,360 66.3% 16,194 7.5% 56,088 26.1%
- Hainan AP 375,426 235,663 62.8% 105,337 28.1% 34,426 9.2%
- Golog AP 137,940 126,395 91.6% 9,096 6.6% 2,449 1.8%
- Gyêgu AP 262,661 255,167 97.1% 5,970 2.3% 1,524 0.6%
- Haixi AP 332,094 40,371 12.2% 215,706 65.0% 76,017 22.9%
Tibetan areas in Sichuan province
- Ngawa AP 847,468 455,238 53.7% 209,270 24.7% 182,960 21.6%
- Garzê AP 897,239 703,168 78.4% 163,648 18.2% 30,423 3.4%
- Muli AC 124,462 60,679 48.8% 27,199 21.9% 36,584 29.4%
Tibetan areas in Yunnan province
- Dêqên AP 353,518 117,099 33.1% 57,928 16.4% 178,491 50.5%
Tibetan areas in Gansu province
- Gannan AP 640,106 329,278 51.4% 267,260 41.8% 43,568 6.8%
- Tianzhu AC 221,347 66,125 29.9% 139,190 62.9% 16,032 7.2%

Total for Greater Tibet:
With Xining and Haidong 10,523,432 5,245,347 49.8% 3,629,115 34.5% 1,648,970 15.7%
Without Xining and Haidong 7,282,154 5,021,231 69.0% 1,470,209 20.2% 790,714 10.9%

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tibet#View ... _community

_________________
" Hayrlar feth olsun ; şerler def olsun !..."


Başa Dön
 Profil Özel mesaj gönder  
 
 Mesaj Başlığı: Re: East Turkestan and Urumchi : Demographics
MesajGönderilme zamanı: 14.07.09, 13:41 #mesajın linki (?)
Çevrimdışı
Kullanıcı avatarı

Kayıt: 14.12.08, 12:14
Mesajlar: 1108
Facing Chinese facts
South Asia continues to appease the People’s Republic, to its own detriment.
By Matthew Akester


First of all, the bitter facts of history: in the political tumult of post-Second World War Asia, newly independent India found its strategic and security interests dramatically compromised by two equally momentous and unforeseen developments, the creation of an Islamic state in the north-west of the country (1947-48), and the full-fledged occupation of Tibet and East Turkestan by communist China (1949-50). New Delhi’s inability to prevent or reverse either development effectively ceded the initiative to China in both regions. In particular, it allowed China to exploit South Asian rivalries, and draw all of India’s neighbours (except Bhutan and the Maldives) into its diplomatic camp. More than 50 years later, still enduring the tremendous toll of defending thousands of kilometres of hostile land borders, New Delhi has yet to come to terms with this disadvantage and find a way forward.

Many Tibetans who lived through the 1959 uprising will tell you how, during the holocaust of repression which followed, they fully expected mighty India (which Tibetans, like Buddhists in other neighbouring countries, regard as the Arya-bhumi) to come to their aid. They were living in another world, and paid the heaviest price imaginable for their isolation from modern geo-political reality. But so too were the new rulers of India if they thought that Chinese military occupation of the heart of the Asian continent would be compatible with Jawaharlal Nehru’s ‘Panchshila’, and that Tibet would effectively remain a neutral zone separating two friendly giants.

In 1957, when the People’s Liberation Army (and their cohorts of prison labourers) had completed a highway linking Yarkand (in Xinjiang province) with west Tibet across Indian territory in the trans-Karakoram at elevations of above 5000 m, one could barely drive an Ambassador up to Mussoorie. Over the next five years, however, roads were hastily built under impossibly demanding conditions all over the Himalayan valleys (with destitute Tibetan refugees providing much of the labour) that Indian troops had to defend from a position of weakness. Their maintenance still costs the country millions of dollars every day.

In other words, independent India’s failure to address the occupation of Tibet as an issue of national and regional concern at the time turned out to be a staggeringly costly miscalculation, which it is still paying for. There are a number of reasons why this fact is not widely recognised in Indian politics and public life. For one, relations with China are the preserve of a bureaucratic and military elite with no discernible strategy other than appeasement. While Beijing has the very nerve to question Indian sovereignty in Sikkim, New Delhi cannot even secure reasonable terms for its citizens making a pilgrimage to Sri Kailasa-Manasarovar. The foreign policy establishment seems to hope that quiescence will bring improved relations, an inscrutable misperception if so, of which China continues to take advantage. In reality, it is startlingly obvious that Tibet is the substantive issue between the two governments of Beijing and New Delhi, and their relationship can scarcely improve in India’s favour until it takes the yak by the horns.

Chinese landslide
After militarisation, perhaps the most serious consequences for South Asia of Chinese misrule in Tibet are environmental. It is a truism that most South Asians depend on rivers of ‘trans-Himalayan’ origin, from the Indus to the Mekong. The Tibetan plateau is not only the fountain-head of Asia but the guarantor of the southwest monsoon, and ecological changes there such as deforestation have a discernible effect on regional weather patterns. For decades there have been unconfirmable reports of nuclear waste dumps and long-range missile bases in occupied Tibet. More recently, the economic boom and increasing mobility of migrant labour in China has ignited an explosion of state- funded infrastructure projects in the ‘western regions’, including the exploitation of river waters. The Chinese regime has a penchant for insanely ambitious mega-projects symbolising the supposed ‘mastery over nature’ to which Stalinist socialism aspires, hence the Three Gorges and now the diversion of Yangtse river waters (with or without nuclear assistance) to the parched north. Another such project, the construction of a massive hydroelectric power station on the great bend in the Brahmaputra recently won central government approval.

There is no evidence to suggest that the interests of those living downstream will figure prominently in the Chinese planners’ calculations. After heavy flooding in mainland China in 1998, the central government was prompted to impose a total ban on logging, notably in the ‘Yangtse watershed’, which is made up of the mercilessly deforested mountains of eastern Tibet. This was the first time the state had addressed the environmental fall-out from the over-exploitation of Tibetan timber, and this represented a definitive innovation of policy. In contrast, no such ban was imposed in the Kongpo or Powo regions bordering Arunachal Pradesh, where the downstream consequences of over-exploitation are not China’s but India’s problem.

The events of July 2000 in that region could be a harbinger of things to come: in April that year, there was a massive landslide at the mouth of the Yiwong Tso lake in Powo, an area which has been plundered by Chinese logging since the 1960s. The slide created a natural dam across the outflow of the lake some 60m high. This eventually burst in early July, releasing a giant surge into the Brahmaputra, which caused the worst flood damage ever recorded in Arunachal Pradesh. When the Arunachal state government made representations to New Delhi about the necessity of reaching an agreement with China on the management of Brahmaputra waters following this incident, they were given no reassurances and the issue has not been raised at national level. A similar surge-flood hit the upper Sutlej valley later that year, causing extensive damage in Kinnaur and Rampur areas of Himachal Pradesh.

Railway to Lhasa
The most significant mega-project of all in this context is of course the Qinghai-Tibet railway, a high priority for the Chinese leadership ever since the invasion, but at that time an unattainable one. Even in this age of over-development, the railway remains an extreme technical challenge. Such are the natural barriers between the two countries that China will have launched astronauts into space before it runs passenger trains to Lhasa, even if the railway is completed on schedule in 2006.

Railways were instrumental in Chinese colonisation of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, slightly more accessible territories whose indigenous populations have been decisively outnumbered by Han migration under communism. There has always been a sense among central planners and the military that Tibet cannot be fully assimilated without one, and their inability to build it has been the main reason for the relatively low numbers of civilian Han migrants in most of Tibet until now. These days there are frequent direct flights to Lhasa from a number of major Chinese cities including Hong Kong, the Qinghai-Tibet highway has been significantly upgraded, and there is a road tunnel under Erlang Shan cutting hours off the drive from Chengdu to Dartsé-do (Kangding) and east Tibet, but for sheer logistical capacity, the movement of goods and people, none of this can compete with a railway.

Now that the Beijing government has embarked on a no-holds-barred campaign of economic and demographic assimilation, the long-mooted railway has become – more than just a logistical necessity – a symbol of China’s heroic struggle against the forces of nature and moderation. Since the launch of the current construction phase of the railway in 2000, official statements and propaganda seem to have abandoned rational, technocratic justifications and cost-benefit analysis altogether, reassuring the nation that no expense will be spared, with a missionary zeal reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward. The implications for Tibet itself are thus rather clear, for the railway represents the physical erasure of all the notions of autonomy which have haunted Sino-Tibetan relations since 1951. However, such an acceleration of China’s capacity to ‘develop’ Tibet is also bound to aggravate regional tensions with South Asia, as long as Beijing remains bent on hegemony rather than neighbourly relations. This can already be seen from recent concerns over the infiltration of Chinese goods into north Indian markets.

There is one other fact for the cynical to consider, especially those who tend to disregard the Tibet issue as an over-indulged plaything of the West. Certainly, hybrid versions of Tibetan Buddhism and culture have become fashionable in the industrialised countries, but one has to distinguish between popular socio-religious trends, however colourful, and concrete political support by Western governments, which has stood at zero ever since the US military backed out of large-scale assistance to the eastern Tibetan resistance in the mid-1950s. (Indeed, by granting political asylum to HH Dalai Lama and the exile government, India has given the Tibetans much more valuable support than any Western country.) At that time, the onus was very much on Britain, as the former colonial power, and the US, as the non-communist superpower, as well as free India, to stand up for Tibet, at least in the United Nations. They failed to do so, as is well known, but unlike India these powers had no strategic interests in the region and could shirk their responsibility with impunity. Now, since the mid-1990s, it is precisely the growth of Western economic collaboration in China’s occupation, in the form of investment, bilateral and non-governmental aid that has done most to embolden the regime, and take the sting out of international protest. After the Tibetans themselves, their South Asian neighbours are the main losers in this scenario.

In conclusion, Tibet is inescapably a South Asian issue, but one effectively q uashed by Beijing’s paranoid refusal to countenance anything like the free flow of people, goods and information across the Himalayas, and by New Delhi’s policy of appeasement. As strategic construction, resource exploitation and urbanisation intensify in occupied Tibet, however, tensions with neighbouring states are likely to grow and to attract attention beyond elite foreign policy circles, given that we live in a world fast shrinking under the impact of global economic development, overpopulation, increased mobility and dwindling natural resources. During the ‘post-Cold War’ 1990s, China’s regional profile became more aggressive, its leaders showed no willingness for improved relations with India but maintained and enhanced their posture of strategic containment (Pakistan, Burma), one of the main justifications for increased defence expenditure (particularly on the navy) in India during this period. There have been numerous lesser irritants, such as Chinese support for the insurgent United Liberation Front of Assam, its indulgence in chequebook diplomacy elsewhere in South Asia, border incursions and smuggling, and failure to support India at the United Nations. In 1962, the patience of India’s leaders snapped after their policy of generous deference to the new China was taken for all it was worth, and they ended up going to war in outraged sentiment, ill-prepared and for the wrong reasons. To avoid repeating that history, new thinking is required, including re-evaluation of the status of Tibet.

_________________
" Hayrlar feth olsun ; şerler def olsun !..."


En son arsiv tarafından 14.07.09, 13:57 tarihinde düzenlendi, toplamda 3 kere düzenlendi.

Başa Dön
 Profil Özel mesaj gönder  
 
 Mesaj Başlığı: Re: East Turkestan and Urumchi : Demographics
MesajGönderilme zamanı: 14.07.09, 13:43 #mesajın linki (?)
Çevrimdışı
Kullanıcı avatarı

Kayıt: 14.12.08, 12:14
Mesajlar: 1108
Tibetans choose unity in Special Meeting

By Pema Thinley

(Editorial, Tibetan review, December 2008)


It was the abject failure of the middle way policy which prompted the Dalai Lama to call for the holding of the Special Meeting of exile Tibetans from November 17 to 22; nevertheless, it was the middle way policy which the majority of the gathering of 560 Tibetan officials, representatives and activists recommended as the best possible course for dealing with China. There are, of course, many ways to explain this paradoxical outcome. The most obvious one is that by it the Tibetans reaffirmed their faith in the Dalai Lama’s leadership and renewed his mandate, and thereby strengthened his moral authority in the face of the recent series of very serious setbacks in dealing with China, including even after reportedly agreeing to accept the communist party of China-led government system for Tibet.

What really led to the decision was obviously the fact that it would be hard to imagine how the exile Tibetan leadership, including the Dalai Lama, would react and what the effect would be within the broader Tibetan society were the gathering to recommend something like independence as the goal for the Tibetan (freedom?) struggle. The exile Tibetans are obviously not prepared for such a radical turn of events, which carries with it the prospect of the Dalai Lama being no longer leading the Tibetan freedom movement. Having unanimously entrusted the Dalai Lama with the task – or mandate – to continue to lead the Tibetan people by bringing his wisdom to bear on the movement in accordance with changing times and circumstances, supporting the middle way approach he so single-mindedly believes in, irrespective of its current apparent hopelessness, was only a logical corollary. After all, it would be very odd to ask the Dalai Lama to continue to lead the Tibetan struggle by thrusting upon him a goal he had so emphatically given up not just out of current political expediency but also as an article of faith and conviction in finding a permanent solution to the Tibet issue.

In that sense, the Special Meeting could even be construed, by implication, as an offer by the Dalai Lama to step down from leading the exile political movement if the Tibetan people felt that the policy he had so eloquently espoused, and which the exile government had so vigorously been promoting and pursuing, should be judged as an irredeemable failure. The Dalai Lama’s logic is obvious: whether the middle way approach had yielded a result or not, we have no alternative but to persevere with it. If that sounds defeatist and like the height of pessimism, that may only be reflective of the dire strait in which the Tibet issue itself had plunged into today. The important point, it would seem, is to maintain hope and occupy the moral high ground gained from being non-violent, compromising and conciliatory to the extent we have been with our middle way proposal, which may be the only position of strength we can have against China and of influence we have on global opinion and support.

Of course there is much that could be argued, powerfully, from the point of view of pursuing the goal of independence, which the Dalai Lama never tires of acknowledging is our inherent historical and legal right. Besides, this has the major advantage of being truly inspiring and soul stirring as a call to join the struggle for the original cause and make sacrifices. Anyone who saw video pictures of the March 2008 uprising in Tibet and the Snowlion flag-wielding activists during the Olympic torch relays in Athens, London, Paris, San Francisco, Canberra, New Delhi and elsewhere can be in no doubt about that. Even more attractive, from the point of view of the international legal order, is the goal of self-determination, under which previously seemingly hopeless cases like East Timor and Kosovo came to see the light of their independence day when the old, seemingly infinite orders suddenly collapsed, yielding fertile grounds for grabbing independence through use of international legal remedies.

While there is a strong, unmistakable outburst of sentiment within the Tibetan community, both in and outside Tibet, in favour of independence, and self-determination is a viable, politically and legally correct, alternative that can generate as much global support as the middle way policy, the Dalai Lama has either abandoned or refrained from resorting to them for a very obvious reason: He is being generous to a fault in accommodating the Chinese government’s empire-size, ego-based concerns and interests and is making the additional concessions that not being in actual control of any part of the territory he campaigns for encourages him too.

The Dalai Lama is, thus, not only willing to forego Tibet’s right to independence although history clearly is on his side on this issue but also seeks to ensure for China a basis for sovereign authority over it for all times in the future. China’s perspective is, however, entirely different. It seeks to rewrite Tibet’s past on the basis of its current situation and remains haughty and arrogant in its confidence that its future will only be of greater power and domination. It, therefore, sees acceding to the Dalai Lama’s offer as an act of weakness and the beginning of the end of its rule not just over Tibet but also other territories over which its hold is equally tenuous, liable to unravel at the first sign of real trouble and weakness within China. China seeks to pre-empt this by demographic assimilation; hence its constant harping on “ethnic unity and solidarity” and emphasis on ensuring the well being of “all ethnic groups” in Tibet. These have, in fact, been the basis of its rejection of the Dalai Lama’s envoys’ memorandum on genuine autonomy for Tibet.

Therefore, the Dalai Lama’s thus far failed middle way approach, even though approved by most of the delegates at the Special Meeting, faces a dim prospect of success “in the near future” unless a sudden development in China forces the government there to change its whole outlook towards the idea of its legitimacy. That certainly does not seem likely to happen in any near future. It was more likely the sanctity Tibetans attach to the idea of unity in the sense of rallying for a single cause behind a single leader, who has to be the Dalai Lama, which obviously exercised a powerful influence on the gathering to come to a face-saving resolution.

***
China did much worse in Tibet - demographic assimilation included - and everyone else shut up.

_________________
" Hayrlar feth olsun ; şerler def olsun !..."


Başa Dön
 Profil Özel mesaj gönder  
 
Eskiden itibaren mesajları göster:  Sırala  
Yeni başlık gönder Başlığa cevap ver  [ 4 mesaj ] 

Tüm zamanlar UTC + 2 saat


Kimler çevrimiçi

Bu forumu gezen kullanıcılar: Hiç bir kayıtlı kullanıcı yok ve 2 misafir


Bu foruma yeni başlıklar gönderemezsiniz
Bu forumdaki başlıklara cevap veremezsiniz
Bu forumdaki mesajlarınızı düzenleyemezsiniz
Bu forumdaki mesajlarınızı silemezsiniz

Geçiş yap:  
cron
   Powered by phpBB © 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007 phpBB Group

Türkçe çeviri: phpBB Türkiye