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Ayetullah Humeyni'nin 1 Şubat 1979 günü Paris'ten Tahran'a gelişinden on gün sonra 11 Şubat 1979 tarihinde Pehlevi rejimi yıkılmış ve yerine 1 Nisan 1979 tarihinde İran İslam Cumhuriyeti ilan edilmiştir.

Daha sonra hazırlanan Anayasa halkoyuna sunularak kabul edilmiş ve 3 Aralık 1979 tarihinde yürürlüğe girmiştir. 1989 yılında revize edilen İran Anayasasında, egemenliğin, yasama, yürütme ve yargı organları tarafından Dini Liderliğin gözetimi altında kullanılacağı ifade edilmektedir. Anayasaya göre, Cumhurbaşkanı yürütmenin başıdır. Ancak, iç ve dış politika önceliklerinin belirlenmesi ya da Silahlı Kuvvetlerin ve Emniyet Güçlerinin sevk ve idaresi Dini Lider’in yetkisindedir.

Dini Lider / Rehber (Veliyy-i Fakih)

Şii inancı uyarınca, On İkinci İmam olan Muhammed el-Mehdi şu anda gayıpta ve görünmezdir. Bilinmeyen bir tarihte Mehdi olarak geleceğine ve zulümlere son vererek adaleti tesis edeceğine inanılmaktadır. On İkinci İmam (İmam Zaman) dönünceye kadar topluma liderlik edecek birinin olması ve ona vekalet etmesi anlayışı üzerine, icra ve içtihad yetkisiyle Müslümanların önderliğini üstlenen Dini Rehber, İran'daki en üst makamdır.

Humeyni tarafından geliştirilen doktrinde, İslam'da din ve siyasetin ayrı olamayacağı belirtildiğinden, Dini Rehber sadece bir dini önder değil, aynı zamanda en yüksek siyasi otoritedir. Dini Rehber ömür boyu süreyle din adamlarından oluşan Uzmanlar Meclisi tarafından belirlenmektedir.

Humeyni’nin 3 Haziran 1989’da vefatının ardından Dini Lider olarak seçilen Ayetullah Seyyid Ali Hamaney bu görevini halihazırda sürdürmektedir.

Mehdi çıkacağı yıl, insanlar hacca, başlarında bir emir bulunmadan gidecekler... Hep birlikte Beyt-i Şerif'i tavaf edecekler, sonra Mina'ya indiklerinde, köpekler gibi birbirine saldıracak, hacılar soyulacak, kanlar Akabe Cemresinin üzerine akacak. (Kıyamet Alametleri, s. 168-169)

İnsanlar başlarında bir imam bulunmaksızın hac ederler. Mina'ya indiklerinde etrafları, köpeklerin sarışı gibi sarılıp, kabilelerin birbirine girmesi ile büyük savaşlar olur. Öyle ki ayaklar kan gölü içinde kalır. (Kitab-ül Burhan Fi Alameti-il Mehdiyy-il Ahir Zaman, s. 35)

Juhayman’s Sins
Nasser Al-Huzeimi: My story with the so-called Mahdi



By Khaled Al-Mushawah

Published: Saturday 21 November 2009 Updated: Sunday 22 November 2009

Thirty years later, Juhayman’s movement still leaves Saudi and Middle Eastern communities in a state of shock. Accordingly, many have linked modern extremist movements to Juhayman’s thought, while on the other hand many believe that Juhayman was but a man with a naive perception of the state. The Majalla has held an interview with Nasser Al Huezzeimi, the man who refused to pledge allegiance to Al Mahdi and refrained from storming the Holy Mosque.

Nasser Al-Huzeimi is a thinker who was witnessed the rise of Juhayman Al-Otaibi, and even approached him from within his group to the extent that he came to define the smallest details of his personality and mentality. He watched closely the establishment stages of the Salafist movement, and knew everything that went on in their secret meetings, in addition to how Juhayman became the leader of the group. Hence, what Al-Huzeimi reveals about the initiation of the group, its establishment and the idea of salvation, may not be known to many. Al-Huzeimi says that Juhayman avoided other groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Jamaat Al Tablighia (Conveying Groups). He also sheds light on Juhayman's relationship with Sheikh Ibn Baaz and Sheikh Al-Albani, his shift from public to secret activities and how the idea of storming the Holy Mosque (Al-Haram) came to mind. Al-Huzeimi also highlights the nature of the Saudi society at the time of Juhayman the impact of the economic situation.

The aforementioned assumption was not endorsed by social studies, but we note that Juhayman grew up in an urbanized area of the desert called Sager. Sager was one of the settlements of the Brotherhood that were established under the rule of King Abdul Aziz for housing nomads. These settlements were a center for teaching nomads religious sciences. Later on, Sager got involved in a battle against King Abdul Aziz in Sabala, and accordingly Juhayman was affected by the conflict, since Juhayman's father, Muhammed ben Saif had migrated to Sager earlier and thus involving Juhayman in the first generation of settlers.

However, Juhayman remained loyal to his tribe and Sager was just a place to live in. He never forgot that he belonged to the desert all throughout growing up. He was more a nomad than an urbanized person.

The Majalla: Was there a relationship between the urbanized desert area to which Juhayman belonged in Sager and the Brotherhood?

I was introduced to a lot of Ikhwanis by Juhayman in the 1970s who participated in robberies, which were of course of old. They told us in their meetings tales of the Brotherhood, Jihad and miracles of Ikhwanis during Jihad. They considered these tales as the second stage of Salaf tales including the conquests of Sahaba (Prophet Muhammed's companions) and the like. These tales were noticeable in their culture and deeply rooted in their mentality.

The Majalla: Did these tales affect their subconscious?

Yes, certainly these tales had a direct effect on them. Even in Juhayman's later acts and stances, we noticed that he took into consideration incidents that had happened to the Brotherhood earlier. For instance, when Juhayman was wanted by the Saudi security forces around 1398 A.H., he justified his escape and refusal to surrender himself based on his fear of meeting the same destiny faced by Ikhwanis before, like Sultan Bin Bijad and many others.

The Majalla: Juhayman worked in the National Guard, and joined the Islamic University. When did he start thinking of establishing the "Salafist Group”?

He founded the Salafist group by the year 1965 A.D. He was oscillating between Al Jamaat Al Tablighia and groups of almost semi-nomadic people from the old Ikhwanis who were still alive. He started his activities before 1965 A.D. After 1965, six men met together, the most prominent of them were Nasser ben Hussain, Sulaiman ben Shteiwi, Saad al-Tamimi and Juhayman Otaibi. They all agreed to establish the Salafist Group. Nearly two of them belonged to Al Jamaat Al Tablighia, one of whom, Suleiman Shteiwi, was a salafist who received learning at the feet of Sheikh Nasser Aldin Al-Albani and the other was Juhayman. Juhayman was still oscillating between the Salafist movement and Tablighi group. As we know, the Al Jamaat Al Tablighia do not focus on Tahweed (monotheism). This group rather focuses its preaching on renunciation, good manners and fair exhortation without any clashes with the authorities. The six men agreed. I only remember four of them because I forgot the names of two of them. But one of them might have died before he joined the group and the other one was excluded because he was a member in the Muslim Brotherhood. He wanted to deviate from the Salafist course of preaching and adopt the approach of Muslim Brotherhood. In brief, this group went to Sheikh Abdul Aziz ben Baaz who was then in Medina. They met him and told him that they wanted to establish a preaching group that would tread in the footsteps of the righteous predecessors, fight heresies in religion, and judge by the Holy Quran and the Prophet's Sunna.

Sheikh Abdul Aziz ben Baaz asked them about the name of this group and they answered him that they chose the name, "Salafist group".

He told them as long as they relied in their exhortation on God, they would call their group "God-Trusting Salafist Group". Thus, the group adopted that name from that time on. The name meant that the group expected to get rewarded by God alone for their actions. And so the group was publicly launched as an Islamic preaching group. The group's first headquarters was a house in the area of El-Hora El-Sharqyia, which Shaykh Ibn Baaz rented for them. It was a large house with a place for giving lectures and lessons (a courtyard), in addition to many other rooms. Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baaz and some Sheikhs (religious leaders) from Medina attended these lessons, including Sheikh Abu Bakr El-Gaziaary. And so the group became one of the Salafist groups devoted solely to God. Its arguments were based entirely on the doctrine of the righteous predecessors and Sahih Hadiths (trusted sayings of the Prophet which have an authentic line of narrators up to the Prophet and free from anomalies or defects). They advocated a pure form of monotheism, and fought all kinds of heresies in religion. The group had its own Shura Council (consultative council), which would meet and discuss things in private without the knowledge of Bin Baaz and the other sheikhs.

The Majlla: How did Sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani influence the path of the group? Did he play a role in choosing the group's path?

The Salafist trend suggested by Sheikh Albani became an essential part of the Salafist concept of the group. It is a concept based on the rejection of sectarianism, the upholding of the right sayings of The Prophet, and the purification of the Sunnah (the sayings and living habits of The Prophet) from weak and wrong Hadiths. Thus, the right Salafi ideology and the Salafi way of understanding monotheism became the substantial equivalent which the group was compelled to embrace. Their concept of monotheism and faith was taken from the books of Salafist religious scholars, particularly those of Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Shaykh Ibn Taymiyah, and Sheikh Ibn al-Qayyim. Their rejection of sectarianism and weak Hadiths, was probably taken from the writings of Sheikh Mohammed Nasser al-Albani, and his disciples. Hence, the group's concept of Salafism was based on a combination of the concepts of those two schools of thought.

The Majalla: The group started as a public group. When did they start their secret activities and begin recruiting followers?

The group started as a public group, because its rationale was based on reminding people of true Islam. At that time there was no prohibition, or any law that prevented the formation of any kind of Islamic groups, as long as theses groups did not affect the important issues of monotheism or form a threat to national security. As a result, there were various Islamic groups, as well as preachers who were known to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Group. Any underground work by the group was done on a very limited scale, such as meetings of the Shura Council.

The Majalla: How had these secret meetings evolved in the phase of mobilizing followers, especially at the end of 1970s? And how come there were a large number of young people from various parts of the Kingdom among the group's followers?

The group began with a small number of followers. Most of them were students at the Islamic University and scientific institutes. However, the group started to grow. Instead of having a single house in El-Hora El-Sharqyia, the group now had a second house: that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Mecca. Some of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were living at that second house. They were mostly students at the Institute of Holy Mosque in Mecca. After that the Muslim Brotherhood house in Riyadh was founded. I remember that the justification for the establishment of the houses was to further expand the group. This was before 1398 A.H. The Muslim Brotherhood's first house was founded in Riyadh, and then they established a second house in Manfuha beside Alroehl mosque. A third house was established in Al-Qanam Street. To my knowledge, the Muslim Brotherhood now had three houses in Riyadh, one in Jeddah, and one in Taif. But the group continued to grow. It now had various supporters. Some of them even considered themselves as part of the Salafist Group, while others were devoted supporters. Also, at that time, by 1398 A.H/1979 A.D, the group managed to attract "many people", particularly from Al Jamaat Al Tablighia (Conveying Groups)

The Majalla: But when did those large numbers of followers start to join the group?

This happened after 1398 A.H/1979 A.D, following the first arrest conducted against the group. A false report was submitted to the authorities claiming that the group had an arsenal of weapons. Nevertheless, the State confirmed that the report was vexatious and untruthful.

The Majalla: Was it easy to join the group? Were there any kind of restrictions that prevented anyone from becoming a member?

The group had none of the restrictions found in other groups. It did not adopt the method of hierarchical ordering. To join the group, one only needed to be a scholar or a seeker of knowledge, and to obey its leader - Juhayman at that time. These were mostly the qualifications needed to join the group. But after Juhayman became wanted by the security authorities, the group became more careful in choosing the elements wishing to join it. Anyone from outside could join the group, but could not have access to many of the secrets of the group, such as the publications that were printed in Kuwait. Not many members in the group knew how these publications were printed, how they were smuggled in and out, or how Juhayman was contacted. Many of them did not know how to contact Juhayman, and who represented the linkage between them and Juhayman, and so on.

The Majalla: You said there were four founders. What was the status of the group from its beginning until Juhayman became the leader? What were his distinguishing qualities?

At the beginning Juhayman was not the leader of the group, yet the group went through several phases. At first Juhayman was on good terms with the four founders and the Shura Council, such as Ahmed Hassan al-Moallem and Sheikh Adil Mazrui and they all agreed on certain issues. But what happened was that Juhayman was the real leader of the group, although this was not declared, he was the most visible one of the four. He led the group in Hajj (pilgrimage to ). He drove his car to attend Zikr sessions (sessions of spiritual rites), which made him very popular. As soon as it was known that he was in the city, everybody started asking about him. On the contrary, no one for example, asked about Solomon El-Shetiwe, Saad Al-Tamimi, or Nasser Bin Hussein, everyone asked about Juhayman. After a period Juhayman took control of the group, in the sense that he began to put the group in difficult situations that often led to its being reprimanded or its preachers receiving negative comments on their speeches.

The Majalla: Is it possible to say that Juhayman had a tendency from the very beginning to become the leader of the group?

Yes, of course. Juhayman was the informal leader. He sought to become the actual leader. He named himself the leader of the group, took leadership of the group and, he very well deserved to be so. He always made initiatives, moved a lot, and devoted all his time to the group, unlike, for example, the remaining three founders mentioned earlier. These three were teachers and had little time to spend in preaching for Islam. At that time, people only had a holiday on Friday, and the only spare time they had was during summer vacation. This highlights the difference between a man who devoted himself to the cause during the entire year, and a group of people who were busy doing their job.

The Majalla: The first clash between the Salafist group and security forces occurred in 1398 A.H. What was the nature of this clash, and how did it happen?

Actually, there was no clash, but a series of arrests that included the group's prominent figures in all places, and then Juhayman fled.

The Majalla: What was the cause of the arrests?

It was a vexatious report, and we heard at the time that the man who wrote it was reprimanded because he mentioned that this group had stores full of weapons.

The Majalla: Let's move on to the main idea that was adopted by Juhayman for his movement, and that is the seizure of the Holy Mosque in Mecca. Who was the source of this idea at the beginning? And how did the idea of seizing the Holy Mosque occur to the Salafist group?

The case of entering the Holy Mosque in Mecca is originally linked to the expected Mahdi issue. They entered the Mosque because they had a scenario for the course of the group, after swearing allegiance to Mohammed Abdullah Al-Mahdi (Muhammad Abdullah Al Qahtani).

They adopted the scenario from the apocalyptic books of Dissentions and Signs of Doomsday. This scenario states that "The man swears allegiance at the corner of the Mosque, and this man performs a sit-in there and then an army comes from Tabuk only to be destroyed. Then this man comes out of the Holy Mosque, travels to Medina and fights the Antichrist.”

Later on, he leaves Medina and travels to Palestine and fights the Jews there and kills them. Jesus Christ then comes back to break the cross and kill the swine. Afterwards, they will go to Syria and pray at the Umayyad Mosque and then Doomsday will occur.

This is the scenario of the group according to the books of Dissentions and Signs of Doomsday.

But three days later, it became clear that Al-Mahdi was killed in the Holy Mosque. Juhayman also refused to believe that Mahdi was killed, and refused to declare that Mahdi was killed. He forced the group to deny his killing, boycotted them and poured his wrath on those who said Mahdi was killed.

He also said that Mahdi could not be killed, but he was only surrounded at the Holy Mosque and would eventually come out. Of course this was an illogical vision, and almost occurred to them because of their obsession with the idea of salvation through the Mahdi.

The Majalla: We can say that the group was primarily obsessed, controlled and motivated by a metaphysical idea of salvation, non-existant in reality but was derived from books of dissentions, legends and metaphysical thoughts. They tried to translate these thoughts into reality, didn't they?

This is an accurate diagnosis and in fact true because this group originally did not have a project for an Islamic state, as we find in groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Liberation Party. This group had the issue of Mahdi rooted in their mentalities; they followed the doctrine that reiterates that the nation's salvation would be through Al-Mahdi, not by establishing a state.

The Majalla: You were not among those who entered the Holy Mosque in Mecca although you were with the Salafist group?

Six months before the incident of storming in the Holy Mosque and swearing allegiance to Mahdi, the group split; one group was not convinced that Mohammed Abdullah Al-Qahtani was the Mahdi and did not also believe in carrying arms inside the Holy Mosque, and I was among this group which was not convinced of entering the Mosque.

The Majalla: This means that the idea emerged 6 months before storming the Holy mosque?

The idea of Mohammed Abdullah Al-Qahtani was discussed one year before breaking into the Holy Mosque. It was based on the belief of some that Mohammed Abdullah Al-Qahtani was the expected Mahdi, because his name was Mohammed Abdullah Al Qahtani, it matched the characteristics mentioned in the religious texts. The texts say that his name and his father's name must match those of Prophet Muhamed (PBUH). He also had a short nose and a tight forehead and was a descendant of the Prophet's family. Based on these features, it was said that Mohammed Abdullah Al-Qahtani was the Mahdi. Things continued like this and 6 months before their breaking into the Holy Mosque a rebellion happened. As a result, we announced that we did not believe in the Mahdi cause.

The Majalla: Speaking about the Islamic groups and movements, you mentioned earlier in your speech that there was a man from the Muslim Brotherhood who withdrew from founding this group. What is the relationship between the Salafist group and other Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaat Al Tablighia and Islamic movements?

In his letter "Removing the Confusion", Juhayman tried to diagnose his attitude towards these groups, and found it relatively naïve. He opposed the Muslim Brotherhood because of their interest in politics, and blamed the missionary group because of their lack of interest in preaching for monotheism. The same goes for their vision of other groups.

They criticize the Muslim Brotherhood for keeping a low-profile but the truth is that their secrecy is almost the same as that of the Salafist Group.

The Majalla: After this analysis, was Juhayman a rebellious personality, a religious utopian or was he both?

Juhayman almost had the two qualities, the rebellious and the utopian character. Juhayman acted with a retaliatory vision, influenced by what had happened to the Brotherhood in Sebla. By the way, he often repeated that the Muslim Brotherhood members who were at Sebla were wrongfully killed and considered them martyrs. This was his vision and he often repeated it. So I believe that Juhayman developed the revolutionary and revengeful attitude earlier, but he needed a legitimate reason for the group to accept it.

The Majalla: But what was the attitude of Juhayman towards the society he lived in, and towards the state? Did he accuse it of apostasy, did he cope with it, or did he live isolated?

Of course Juhayman did not reconcile with his society for several reasons: his character was originally nomadic; society in general was moving towards civilization while the nomadic character of Juhayman opposed this aspect. Moreover, Juhayman saw that this society was showing signs that Doomsday was looming. Juhayman believed that dissentions overwhelmed the whole society. Juhayman specified the types of seditions in the Letter of Dissention and Signs of Doomsday: banknotes which resemble photos, television, etc. These dissentions were widespread and accordingly he developed a negative attitude towards this issue both at the levels of society and state. In addition, Juhayman opposed working for the government and believed a governmental job would prevent you from saying the truth. He believed that as long as one took a salary from the state, one wouldn't not be able confront it with the truth.

The Majalla: Is it possible to say that Juhayman was an intellectual extension of the nomadic group of Brothers in God's Obedience? Or did he follow a different path?

Juhayman was almost an intellectual extension of this group, with some additions. If you read the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood in cases of monotheism and faith, you will find it the same literature of the group of Brothers in God's obedience, but with the addition of new issues. These issues included the Prophet's traditions, and repudiating sectarianism.

The Majalla: Some people try to link Juhayman’s movement and modern extremist groups that have emerged recently along with Jihadist tides. They also say that Juhayman’s movement paved the way for these recent movements.

In general, we can not say that recent groups are an extension of Juhayman’s thought for several reasons. The most important one is that Juhayman's thought is based on spiritual salvation and does not have a project for establishing a state. If you look at Juhayman's letters, you will find him talking about the Mahdi establishment of the state of justice, but where are the details?

There are not any, unlike the case of current groups such as al Qaeda, they talk about establishing a state and the stages they would go through. They create chaos to force the other side to recognize their right to establish a state.

However, they do not have a project for this state. I do not believe that the current groups, especially the jihadist or extremist ones are similar to the Juhayman group. I always say that Juhayman's influence on the groups that followed him was a temporary one.

The Majalla: After arresting and killing Juhayman, are there any people who still believe in the idea of salvation? Or did it end with the demise of Juhayman?

The idea of salvation in general had ended as soon as Al-Mahdi was assassinated. But some people are fanatic in their belief in Mahdi. Two of them were with us in the group and until now we mock them because they believed Mahdi was not killed but managed to escape and lives in the mountains of Yemen. But this talk has become naive, especially after the incident at the Holy Mosque.

The Majalla: What do you think of the incident of attacking the Holy Mosque?

There was a global rejection of this incident because it happened in the most sacred place for Muslims. The incident occurred in the sacred month of Muharram, in the sacred city of Mecca, and resulted in the shedding of Muslim blood.

The incident was so hideous that everyone condemned it. Even most of the Islamic sects refused these acts. No Islamic group issued a statement to support the attack against the Holy Mosque.

http://www.majalla.com/en/interview/article10940.ece

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_cla ... supporters

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6313433.stm

The Dream That Became A Nightmare

Juhayman al-Otaibi


Published: Saturday 21 November 2009 Updated: Sunday 22 November 2009

The story of Juhayman, in many ways begins with the action that led to his death – the Seige of Mecca. Understanding what took place in 1979 however would be incomplete with out a review of what drove this man to instigate an event that many claim would impact Saudi society for years to come.

The place: The courtyard of the Holy Mosque in Mecca. The time: the dawn of the first of Muharram 1400 A.H, 20 November 1979. The scene: Thousands of worshippers entering the Mosque, as they usually did every day, to perform the morning prayers, in one of the holiest spots on Earth. Dozens of mourners carrying coffins of the dead on their shoulders. Both the worshippers and the guards of the Mosque were overwhelmed by such a large number of dead people. But they thought nothing about it. They were accustomed to seeing coffins at the Holy Mosque. Many of those living near Mecca wished for the large number of worshipers at the Mosque to pray for their loved ones. However, this time there was something different.

The coffins were filled with firearms and ammunition, which the (God Trusting Salafist Group), led by Juhayman al-Otaibi, had prepared for this day. Juhayman al-Otaibi and his brother- in- law, Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Qahtani, who claimed to be the Mahdi, stood before the worshipers in the Holy Mosque and announced to the people the news of the Mahdi, his flight from the "enemies of Allah". They told the people that he was ready to receive their pledge of allegiance between Hijr Ismael (a place at the Holy Mosque) and the Maqam (the stone in which Ibrahim stood while he was building the Kaaba) under the shadow of the Kaaba.

Juhayman was not babbling. He was not insane. He was seeking to achieve his dream of leadership, which Qahtani, had told him he would achieve. He told Juhayman so when he confided in him that he had seen in his dreams that he, Qahtani, was the Mahdi! And that he will liberate the Arabian Peninsula and the whole world from evil-doers.

Juhayman was obsessed with the idea of salvation when he decided to pledge allegiance to Qahtani at Hijr Ismael (a place at the Holy Mosque). He recalled some of the sayings of the Muslim prophet that confirmed that the siege will not last more than three days, and that the army which they will be fighting will come from Tabuk (a province in north western Saudi Arabia). But God will order the earth to swallow up the attacking army and a number of miracles will occur confirming that Mohammed al-Qahtani is really the Mahdi. Consequentially, millions of people would start pouring into Mecca to pledge allegiance to the Mahdi.

Juhayman was so enraptured with these thoughts that he made every possible effort to turn this illusion into reality. He was determined to do so even of it meant facing the whole world. In front of this Juhaymani determination the Saudi security forces had nothing to do except besiege the Holy Mosque, which Juhayman and his followers seized, for seventeen days. This was not what Juhayman and his followers had expected. They though that their mission would be an easy one. That only three days would pass before their leader's promise was fulfilled. The earth would swallow the security forces.

But three days passed without anything happening to the security forces. No harm was done to them, and they were not swallowed by the earth. Juhayman and his followers fell into despair. They lost all of hope. And, after Qahtani killed himself, any dreams they might have had, started to vanish. Juhayman did not find a way to control his followers except by threatening to kill anyone who thought of disobeying him or even mentioning the death of the Mahdi. Juhayman could not bear the thought of losing his dream.

He started spreading rumours that the Mahdi was trapped in the (basement), and that he would come out soon. But as they say, "a lie never lasts". It quickly became clear to everyone that Juhayman was lying. He lost control over his followers and did not know what to do. In the end, he surrendered with what remained of his followers in the basement of the Holy Mosque, after abandoning their posts at the top of the Mosque's minarets. The Saudi television broadcast was interrupted, and Nayef bin Abdul Aziz appeared on the screen. His face showed signs of fatigue accompanied by a hint of gladness. He announced that the basement of the Holy Mosque had been purified of all rebellious elements, drawing the curtain at the most difficult stages in the modern history of Saudi Arabia.

The handful of perpetrators who profaned the sanctity of the ancient house were tried. King Khalid bin Abdul Aziz issued order No. 4207 / 2 stipulating the execution of the arrested members of Juhayman's gang who were involved in the seizure of the Holy Mosque. His orders included carrying out their execution in a number of different provinces, to make an example of them. On the same day 63 of those involved in the attack were executed: 15 in Mecca, 7 in Medina, 10 in Riyadh, 7 in Dammam, 7 in Buraidah, 5 in Hail, 7 Abha, 5 Tabuk. Juhayman was one of those who received a death sentence. He was executed on 9 January 1980.

Juhaymen’s death closed the file of the first incident of religious extremism in Saudi Arabia led by the infamous Juhayman. He never expected his fate to end this way. Juhayman, who was born in 1936, and was known as Abu Mohammed, began his career as an ordinary employee at the Saudi National Guard for eighteen years. He stayed in his post from 1955 to 1973, until he finally left the army.

He then moved to Medina, where he studied at the Islamic University and met with Muhammad ibn Abdullah Al-Qahtani, his future brother in-law. Juhayman's life went through a dramatic change after he met with Al-Qahtani. He started spreading their shared ideas in some small mosques in Medina. These ideas of salvation were positively received by some people. The group founded by Juhayman started to grow, until its members grew to the thousands.

The Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz's gave his blessings for the foundation of the group in mid 1960s. The group at first was centrally controlled by a council that consisted of Nasser Bin Hussein, Suleiman Bin Shteiwi, Saad Tamimi, and Juhayman Al-Otaibi. But Juhayman's devoutness to preaching, the internal power that he felt, and his aspiriation for leadership, made him become the driving force of the group. He considered the massage of the group to be his own personal message. He believed that he alone had the right to be its leader. So he did not hesitate to drive his car to roam the villages in the eastern parts of Medina, preaching his message.

Being obsessed with the idea of leadership, he suddenly transformed by anger. It was then, in 1978, that Juhayman and the members of the group were wanted, for the first time, by the Saudi authorities. Their contentious talk about revenging the Sebla brothers had become problematic. In the meantime, he was working on releasing several letters, and most importantly "the seven letters". These letters were concerned with principality, allegiance, obedience, exposing how the rulers of the Islamic world deceived scholars and common people - the later was a letter that he wrote defending the brothers who were in the army of the founder King - and lifting the confusion. These letters were printed in Kuwait. The leftist Kuwaiti magazine "Taleaa" issued a cheap edition of the books of Juhayman, which were smuggled across the northern border of the Kingdom by his followers, who disguised themselves as shepherds and hid the books under dry bread.

Many, to this date, doubt that Juhayman had the intellectual capacity to write those infamous letters. But with his execution, his secrets were buried with him. What remains on Juhaymen is the memory of the event he created, and the impact that still endures in Saudi Society.

http://www.majalla.com/en/profile/article10978.ece

The End of Jihad

30 Years After the Siege of Mecca


By Jean-Pierre Filiu
Published: Saturday 21 November 2009 Updated: Sunday 22 November 2009

Thirty Years after the attacks on Mecca, Professor Jean Pierre Filiu, traces the evolution of this tactic. Highlighting the rise of nationalist and revolutionary jihad, Filiu illustrates how modern attempts of jihad are demonstrative of a crisis within Al-Qaida. More importantly, it highlights the hallow call of jihad, or the inevitable failure of this tactic to promote global revolution.

November 20, 1979, is the first day of muharram, or the first month of 1400 according to the Islamic calendar. It is also the day the siege of Mecca took place. The fifteenth century of Islam opened with a sacrilege of such magnitude that its impact took time to dawn upon observers and believers alike. On this day, the collective prayer in Mecca haram was disrupted by some two hundred gunmen, who pledged allegiance to Muhammad al-Qahtani, a self-proclaimed Mahdi. This extraordinary pledge was purportedly based on a classical hadith, whereby the Mahdi would appear at the end of time, between Abraham’s station (maqam) and one of the Kaaba’s corner (rukn). Juhayman al-Utaybi, Qahtani’s brother-in-law, led the insurgents and justified his doomsday jihad by the urge to “purify” Islam. He began with its holiest site.

The siege lasted two weeks, resulted in hundreds of casualties and ruined part of the sanctuary. The Saudi public and the Muslim world watched in horror as Utaybi’s followers turned Mecca’s compound into a battlefield. The rebels, holed up in their apocalyptic creed and loaded with ammunitions became completely isolated and their revolutionary pamphlets stirred only shock and disbelief. Their messianic uprising was so incredible that many conspiracy theories started to float, and radical demonstrators even stormed the US Embassy in Pakistan, pretending this was all an American “plot”. Qahtani was killed, but Utaybi survived, only to be executed with dozens of insurgents, a few weeks later. Revolutionary jihad consequently came to be identified in Saudi Arabia with sacrilege and the Sunni community considered any invocation of the Mahdi with utmost suspicion.

While Utaybi’s message ended with his death, a new front opened for jihad in the East: the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, and the resistance rallied under the banner of jihad against foreign occupation, putting aside ethnic and linguistic differences. This Afghan jihad was the last of a long series of anti-colonial insurgencies against European domination. Others also led by charismatic figures included Abdelkader in Algeria (1832-1847), Shamil in the Caucasus (1834-1859) and Umar al-Mukhtar in Libya (1911-1931). The Afghans fought to liberate their country and, in nearly ten years of anti-Soviet struggle, they never exported their violence outside of the Afghan borders.

The Afghan mujahideen requested their fellow Muslims to support their nationalist uprising politically and materially, but they needed many more weapons than volunteers since the anti-Soviet fighters were numerous. Nevertheless, two former militants of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jordanian Abdallah Azzam and the Saudi Usama Bin Laden, established, the Services Bureau in Pakistan an international network to channel Arab funds and recruits to the anti-Soviet jihad. The operation was launched at a very low key and developed only in 1986-87. Thousands of Arab militants were welcomed in training camps in Western Pakistan, but only hundreds of them crossed the border to actually fight in Afghanistan, where their contribution to the liberation of the country was negligible.

Azzam respected the Afghan freedom struggle, while Bin Laden planned to organize independent Arab units of jihadi militants. He radicalized this vision under the influence of Ayman al-Zawahiri and the militants from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ): the liberation of Muslim lands from foreign occupation was only one dimension of an all-out jihad, whose ambition was to topple the Muslim regimes, branded as “apostates”. This accusation of apostasy, or takfir, alienated this group from the rest of the militants and was central in the clandestine founding of Al-Qaida (“the Base”, in Arabic), in August 1988. All the members of Al-Qaida had to pledge personal and absolute allegiance to Bin Laden. Azzam had no place in this grand design and he was killed in a booby-trapped bombing in November 1989.

Competing Jihads

At the beginning of the nineties, the stage was set for a renewed era of competition between revolutionary jihad and nationalist jihad. The nascent Al-Qaida played on both sides to promote its original agenda of global jihad. The “Afghan” veterans were back in the Arab world and while their military credentials were often debatable, their political prestige was impressive. In Algeria and Egypt, they weighed in favor of the escalation of the revolutionary campaign of jihadi terror against the regime and its supporters. Al-Qaida tried to take advantage of these civil wars, but the Algerian Islamic Armed Group (GIA) rejected any foreign interference, even from fellow jihadis. Likewise, the Egyptian activists of the Gamaa islamiyya admitted their defeat in 1997 by suspending their violent campaign.

Frustrated with revolutionary jihad, Al-Qaida tried to hijack nationalist struggles for its own benefit. The jihadi volunteers that traveled to Bosnia after the dismantling of Yugoslavia in 1992, where they were contained by the regular Bosnian army and eventually expelled in the fall of 1995. After 1996 Al-Qaida was more successful in monitoring the training of the Pakistani guerrillas that were smuggled into Kashmir to fight the Indian forces. However, they were also successful in eliminating the local supporters of Kashmiri independence. In the same spirit, the Arab fighters that went to Chechnya helped the radical Shamil Basaiev against the nationalist trend. Their offensive against neighboring Daghestan, in August 1999, gave to the Red army the justification for coming into Chechnya and crushing the independent republic.

At the time, Al-Qaida was still a codename, used only by insiders, but in February 1998 global jihad went public when Bin Laden and Zawahiri announced the launching of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.” In their manifesto, they urged any Muslim individual, anywhere in the world, to strike anytime at any American or any American ally, without distinction between civilian and military targets. This global jihad was clearly a modern invention, contradicting fourteen centuries of Islamic practice and tradition: jihad had generally been a collective duty. Only through a consensus of the ulama and the religious leaders could individual jihad be considered legitimate, and only in very specific and limited circumstances. Al-Qaida’s free-for-all interpretation of jihad was without precedent, it cut the historical link between jihad and a community to be mobilized or a territory to be defended. Both Bin Laden and Zawahiri lacked any dogmatic credentials to substantiate such an innovation.

Al-Qaida could flourish in Afghanistan under the protection of Mullah Umar’s “Islamic emirate”. A new generation of jihadi volunteers flocked to training camps, this time not to fight an invading army on a specific territory, but to export subversion globally. Al-Qaida’s encompassing vision could articulate the regional agendas of its most vibrant partners, like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia or the Jemaa Islamiyya (JI) in South East Asia. The Taliban trusted their Arab allies in the international arena letting them implement violent provocations and effectively turning their whole territory into a full-fledged “Jihadistan”, dedicated to the promotion of global jihad.

The attacks on New York and Washington, on September 11, 2001, were planned to trigger a wave of revolutionary jihad all over the Muslim world, while Al-Qaida was betting on American reprisals against Afghanistan and hoping the US would be defeated on that battlefield like the late USSR. Bin Laden’s strategic gamble collapsed with the quick demise of the Taliban regime and with the general outrage against the 9/11 attacks. So Al-Qaida, increasingly isolated, went underground to prepare its own terror campaign against Saudi Arabia. Launched in May 2003, this series of bombings generated a backlash against the jihadi ideology and most of the activist networks were dismantled in less than two years.

The Crisis of Global Jihad

It took the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, for Al-Qaida to reconstitute some of its potential, collaborating with the nationalist insurgency. But the local guerrillas resented Zarqawi’s use of Iraq as a platform to export terror in the neighboring countries, like in Amman in November 2005. So tensions escalated and the national jihadis ultimately expelled Al-Qaida from its stronghold in the Western province of Anbar, in 2007. The defeat of Bin Laden’s followers, not by the US army, but by Sunni guerrillas, was a devastating blow for the global jihad and sent shockwaves all over the Muslim world, weakening Al-Qaida’s prestige and franchises.

This showdown between global and national jihad reached new rhetorical heights when Al-Qaida, frustrated with the absence from Lebanon and Palestine, started a propaganda campaign against Hezbollah and Hamas. It accused them of having “sold” their land and their cause to Israel by accepting ceasefires or elections. It urged Hamas to establish an “Islamic emirate” in Gaza, but Bin Laden’s sympathizers were crushed by Hamas forces. Al-Qaida repeatedly used sectarian slanders to attack the Shi’a guerrillas in Lebanon, without reaching a breakthrough on the ground. Global jihad turned increasingly virtual and relied heavily on Internet, while national jihad was deeply pushing its militant roots.

So Al-Qaida, unable to sustain a revolutionary jihad in Saudi Arabia, also failed to divert national jihad in the Middle East. The crisis of the global jihad was worsened when even the most radical of the jihadi scholars withdrew their support from Al-Qaida (including one of its founding members, the Egyptian “Doctor Fadel”, or Sayyid Imam al-Sharif). Bin Laden and his followers were portrayed as having “betrayed” the core values of Islam. They reacted by stressing the privilege of the jihadi fighters, even those with no religious background, to decide what is right and wrong in Islam. Al-Qaida is promoting a new cult, transferring the theological legitimacy from the ulama to the militants. This escalation of symbolic violence matches the fact that the overwhelming majority of Al-Qaida’s victims are Muslims.

Bin Laden, faced with this growing problem, looked more positively on Utaybi’s revolutionary jihad. But Al-Qaida continues to adhere to its global agenda and does not follow any doomsday countdown. The sacrilege of Mecca has neutralized most of the messianic energies in the Sunni world. The situation is totally different in the Shi’a world, where the longing for the Mahdi, or Hidden Imam, has strong political undertones. Moqtada Sadr, an Iraqi cleric aged only 30, but son and grand-nephew of two “martyred” ayatollahs, played on this dimension when launching his “Mahdi’s army” in 2003. The “sadrist” movement combined military jihad and political maneuvers, while a more clear-cut doomsday militia, “The Supporters of the Imam Mahdi”, developed in Southern Iraq. Their uprising was crushed in the holy city of Najaf, in January 2007, and the outrage was comparable in the Shi’a world to the shock caused in the whole umma, in November 1979, by the storming of the Kaaba.

Utaybi’s Hallow Call

Thirty years after the bloodbath in Mecca, Utaybi’s call for arms rings no echo. Revolutionary jihad has failed everywhere in the Muslim world or, like in Somalia, has engineered endless cycles of civil war. The jihadi scene is therefore dominated by national jihad, especially in the cases of Hamas and Hezbollah, but their confrontation with Israel has made them more popular outside than inside their own territories. Ethno-national jihad is also the name of the game for militant guerrillas fighting for Muslim minorities, as in Thailand or in Philippines, but the lack of unified leadership is weakening their position. In all these crises, the need to convert the military records into political achievements is the main challenge faced by nationalist jihad.

During the past three decades, news headlines have been focusing on the violent dimension of jihad, ignoring the growing popularity of the non-military version of jihad. International campaigns against poverty, illiteracy or pandemics have been launched under the banner of jihad, for instance through the Organization of Islamic Conference. The increased empowerment of civil society led to other initiatives of socially-conscious jihad. While Al-Qaida is drifting away from Islam and promoting its own cult, this grass-root evolution is a welcome reminder that jihad is not necessarily violent and that it is a comprehensive endeavor to fulfill the Prophet’s message.



Professor at Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po) and was visiting professor at Georgetown University. The French History Convention awarded its main prize to his “Apocalypse in Islam,” to be published in English by the University of California Press.

http://www.majalla.com/en/cover_story/article10926.ece

Mustafa Özcan

Yeni Akit 2010-01-25

Fantastik mehdiler

Mehdi meselesi hadisler yoluyla subut bulmuştur. Hatta kimi Şii uleması Kur’an-ı Kerim’de bu meseleye dolaylı atıflar olduğunu ileri sürüyorlar. Sıfat ve umumiyet nevinden elbette her şey söylemek mümkün. Lakin Mesih meselesinde olduğu gibi mesele çok boyutlu ve onun ötesinde müteşabihat arasındadır ve tayinde yanılma payı vardır. Ancak gerçeği, tahakkukundan sonra yakinen bilinebilir. Aksi takdirde, yanılma payı mümkün ve belki de yüksektir. Günümüzde kimileri ya Mehdi’nin sözcüsü gibi davranıyor ya da bizzat Mehdi imiş gibi pozlar ve tavırlar içine giriyorlar. Dolayısıyla günümüzde bolca iddia makamında kendinden menkul mehdiler bulunuyor. Mehdiliklerini, zorlama ve tevil yoluyla doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak ilan ediyorlar. ‘İstim veya icraatlarım arkadan gelir’ diye kendilerine teselli veriyor ve de işin hakikatini sulandırıyorlar. Maalesef bu iddia makamında olan zevat zihinlerin bulanmasına ve toplumsal kargaşaya neden oluyorlar. Halbuki, Mehdi’nin belki de birinci vazifesi kargaşaya son vermektir. Mehdi anlayışında iki tarz vardır. Bu tarzlardan birisi Sünni diğeri de bid’i anlayıştır. Sünnete uygun anlayışa göre Mehdi portresi salih bir kuldur ve onun ötesinde insanların da tensibiyle birlikte ıslaha yönelir ve muslih olur. Salih insan insanların kendisini ataması yani otorite olmasıyla birlikte zulüm ve mezalimi ortadan kaldırmaya çalışır ve İslam dünyasının perişan ve dağınık halini toparlar. Belki bu anlamda Kudüs’ün fatihi olur. Bir de buna mukabil bid’i ve batini Mehdi tasavvuru ve anlayışı vardır ki sünnetullahı tatil eden ve aklı örten bir anlayıştır. Bu batini Mehdi tasavvurları aynı zamanda fantastik mehdi anlayışlarına tekabül etmektedir. Zira sünnetullahı aşarak aklın sınırlarının da dışına çıkmış olur.
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Bu veya çakma Mehdilik anlayışında tekellüf, zorlama ve kurgulama vardır. Ve bu halleriyle söz konusu Mehdi taslakları ve adayları toplumun zihnini bulandırır ve kargaşaya neden olur. Bu yönüyle de, Mehdi’nin zıddını çağrıştırır. Nasıl iddia makamındaki Mesih’ler anti Mesih veya Deccal ise sahte veya isabetsiz mehdiler de İmam Rabbani’nin bahsettiği ve uyardığı Mehdicilik hastalığının tezahürleridir. Bu ruşeni veya batini Mehdiler, İmam Rabbani döneminde de epey velveleye neden olmuşlardır. İslam tarihindeki en büyük sapma çığırlarından birisini Mehdicilik çığırları ve cereyanları oluşturmaktadır. Bu hakikatine mani olmasa bile ihtiyata davet eden bir haldir. Son sıralarda kimileri Mehdi adına hoyratça konuşurken kimilerine de bizzat kendi mehdiliklerine işaret etmektedirler. Bu bağlamda, İsmail Çetin Hoca kimilerinin Ayetullah Humeyni’nin mehdiliğine inandıklarını, lakin yanıldıklarını ve isabet kaydedemediklerini söyler. Zaten Ayetullah Humeyni hakkında Mehdi yakıştırması veya tasavvuru bizzat temsil ettiği anlayışa terstir zira onların benimsedikleri Mehdi, Hasan Askeri’nin oğludur. Son sıralarda Mehdilik meselesi Türkiye’de de gündemi meşgul ediyor. Bu bağlamda, ‘el Kaide unsurlarına karşı’ polis operasyonlarında müteferrik gruplara baskınlar yapıldı ve bazı tutuklamalar gerçekleştirildi. Bu tutuklamaların ardından, Kanal D gibi kimi kanallar tutuklananlardan en azından bazılarının Bin Ladin’i Mehdi telakki ettikleri yönünde bir habere yer verdi. Bizzat Bin Ladin’in böyle bir iddiaya sahiplik ettiğini bilmiyoruz. Kanal D’nin söz ettiği gruplar gerçekten de buna inanıyorlar mı? Bunu da, bilmiyoruz. Lakin böyle bir durum varsa bile bu ancak ‘şeyh uçmaz müridi uçurur’ çerçevesinde olmalıdır.
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Bu hastalık sadece bize mahsus değil elbet. İddialara göre, 2004 yılında Sa’de vilayetinde Yemen kolluk güçleriyle çarpışırken vefat eden Hüseyin Husi hakkında da taraftarları Mehdi olduğunu ileri sürüyorlar. Zeydiler, İsna Aşeri olmadıklarından onlara göre Mehdi elbette ki on ikinci imam değildir. Bundan dolayı yani onların anlayışına göre, Ehl-i beyt mensuplarından birisi pekala Mehdi adayı olabilir. Lakin ölmüş birisinin geri geleceği inancı olan ricat ilk Şii ayaklanmalarından sonra vefat eden bazı kimseler için de gündeme getirilmişti. Gerçekten de kimi Husiler buna inanıyorlarsa, demektir ki onlar tarihin izini sildiği yanlışlara yeniden geri dönmüş oluyorlar. Yemen yönetimi, Husilerin geleneksel imamet kurumunu ihya etmek istediklerini ileri sürüyor. Kimileri de -belki düşmanları da olabilir- Husilerin, Hüseyin Husi’nin mehdiliğine inandıklarını söylüyor. Gerçekten de bu bir yakıştırma değilse vahim bir durumla karşı karşıyayız demektir. Benzeri iddialarla iltisaklı olarak anılan Türkiye’deki bazı zümreler de İsrail’den gelen misafirlerine Süleyman Mabedini birlikte inşa etme teklifinde bulunuyor. Bütün bunların çaresi, aslında İslam’ın safi kaynağına dönmek ve dünyevi rekabetten olduğu gibi uhrevi rekabet ve çekişmelerden de kaçınmak ve dini Allah için halis kılmaktır. Yoksa kurgu ve zorlama ile çıktığımız yolun sonu hayal ettiğimiz noktaya varmayacak, aksine cadde-i kübranın dışındaki tali yollardan birisi haline gelerek; bizi hakiki yolumuzdan da saptıracak ve koparacaktır.